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\God came down to see what they [the tower builders of Babylon] did and
said: `They ... have one language, and nothing will be withholden from them
which they purpose to do.' So God said, `Come, let us go down and confound
their speech.' And so God scattered them upon the face of the Earth, and
confused their languages, and they left o building the city ..."
| Genesis 11: 5-8
1. Introduction
A similar design of collusive practices, referred to as the \lysine strategy prole" (hereafter
\LSP") by Harrington and Skrzypacz (2011), is frequently observed in recently discovered car-
tels. The LSP has two components: (1) information sharing and (2) within-cartel transfers.
Specially, non-public information that is usually closely guarded by rms in a competitive mar-
ket, such as sales or customer lists, is assembled and exchanged, providing a basis for assessing
deviations to collusive terms; Based on the information, rms make transfers within the cartels;
Particularly, rms that oversold compensate rms that undersold. Nearly half of the cartels dis-
covered by the European Commission (hereafter \EC") under its new leniency regime (i.e, after
February 19, 2002) had such monitoring and compensation mechanisms in place.1 79 percent of
international cartels of the 90s sampled by Levenstein and Suslow (2011) exchanged sales infor-
mation to monitor cheating; One-third agreed upon a within-cartel transfers scheme.2 Cartel
organizational features, such as the LSP, have gained increasing attention from academics and
policy makers alike in recent years (e.g., Kuhn 2001; Moldovanu 2001; Levenstein and Suslow
2006a, b; Harrington and Skrzypacz 2007, 2011; Vives 2007; Bennett and Collins 2010; OECD
2010). However, little is known empirically about the eect of these features on cartel success.
This paper estimates the impact of the particular and often-used organizational feature| the
LSP| on cartel duration.3 The results have implications for design of anti-cartel rules that aim
to detect and destabilize cartels through scrutinizing communication and purchases between
competitors.
1The calculation is based on 57 cartel decisions by the EC for the period February 2002 to April 2011. The
result is not reported in the tables.
2See Levenstein and Suslow (2011), p. 471.
3\Lysine strategy" is dened slightly more broadly in this paper than that in Harrington and Skrzypacz
(2011). The precise denition is given in Table 1.
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There is a growing body of empirical research that highlights the association between cartels'
organizational features (such as monitoring and within-cartel transfers) and cartel duration
(e.g., Suslow 2005, Zimmerman and Connor 2005, Levenstein and Suslow 2011). However,
the existing literature does not adequately address the endogeneity of the features to cartel
duration and thus does not convincingly establish a causal relationship. Simply put, it is quite
likely that \fragile" cartels| cartels that would otherwise be unsustainable| need and create
a mechanism of policing and enforcement to prolong their temporary existence. In addition
to endogeneity, omitted variables| for example, sectoral demand uctuations (Suslow 2005;
Harrington and Skrzypacz 2011)| may drive both a cartel's duration and its decision regarding
whether to adopt an organizational feature, producing misleading estimates on the impact of
the feature.4 For instance, increased demand volatility may lead to both increased complexity
in formulating a \cartel contract" and increased diculty in monitoring the \contract".
This paper proposes an identication strategy for estimating the causal eect of the LSP
on cartel duration employing instrumental variable estimation. Specically, I use exogenous
variation in cartel members' national language dierences as an instrumental variable for the
incidence that a cartel uses the LSP. The number of dierent national languages is a plausible
instrument for the LSP: Unlike the initial bargaining and regenotiation that are typically held
by top-level executives to determine the terms of cartel \contract" and to build trust (Levenstein
and Suslow 2006b), communication for monitoring purposes, such as the ones that form the
cornerstone of the LSP, is usually undertaken by low-level managers (Levenstein and Suslow
2006a, 2006b; Harrington 2009) who may not be multilingual in general.5 Therefore, linguistic
dierences pose a sometimes insurmountable barrier to using the LSP. The instrumental variable
method makes it credible to assert that the association between the LSP and cartel duration is
a causal relationship rather than simply a correlation. As such, this paper is the rst to study
the endogeneity of cartel organization to cartel success. This is worthwhile because, as will be
shown, if the endogeneity of organization is not taken into account, the estimate of its eect
will be biased.
4Suslow provides empirical evidence that the more uncertain the environment within which a cartel operates,
the shorter the expected cartel duration (p. 705). Harrington and Chang show that a cartel lasts longer if the
rms earn less prot from cheating.
5Levenstein and Suslow (2011) noted that linguistic dierences could pose a challenge in cartel cooperation.
However, they did not carry out an analysis in this direction. Levenstein and Suslow (2006a) also noted that
cartel meetings for monitoring purpose are generally undertaken by low-level managers.
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The EC discovered cartel data set is an ideal choice for this identication strategy: 81 per-
cent of the cartelized markets involve intermediate goods| so that customers are industrial
buyers and thus price and sales are private information between a buyer and a seller (Harrington
and Skrzypacz 2007, 2011). This creates an incentive for rms to cheat and a potential need for
cartels to monitor and promote compliance (through using, for example, the LSP); Moreover,
a considerable number of cartels (81) involve rms of dierent national languages| so that
the rms face a potential barrier in exchanging information (and in conditioning transfers on
the information). I nd that the number of languages is in fact signicantly negatively related
to the incidence that the LSP is used (in the rst-stage regression). However, my identica-
tion strategy is inappropriate for other cartel organizational features (such as market-leader
arrangement), since linguistic dierences are not suciently closely linked to those features.
Although the analysis is conned to the LSP, it is likely to be of exceptional interest from both
the research and policy perspectives, since the incidence of the LSP is high and has increased
in the past three decades.6
The main empirical ndings are as follows. Using a comprehensive data set of EC cartel
discoveries over a 30-year span, I nd, across a range of regression specications, that the
relationship between cartel duration and the incidence of the LSP is weak and statistically
insignicant. In the second main result, I nd that the LSP increases cartel duration. The
impact is statistically signicant, large in magnitude, and robust to various specication and
sample choices: Using the LSP, i.e., exchanging private information and making transfers based
on the information, decreases the likelihood of cartel dissolution by over seven times.
These results resonate with the recent ndings by Harrington and Skrzypacz (2011). They
show that colluding rms may use the LSP to sustain collusion in information scarce environ-
ments where demand is volatile and price and sales are private information and that the LSP
is not needed for organizing collusion if demand is non-stochastic or if prices and sales are
commonly observed (p. 8). Moreover, they show that the LSP provides the colluding rms
with an incentive to truthfully self-report deviation to and abide by the collusive terms (pp.
10-12).
Admittedly, there are several alternative causal determinants of cartel duration dierences,
6Calculations based on 135 cartel decisions by the EC for the period December 1980 to April 2011 show that
32 percent of the cartels discovered by the EC in 80s used the LSP; Over 40 percent of the discovered cartels
in the 90s and 2000s had such collusive practices.
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aside from the lysine strategy prole, that could be naturally correlated with rms' linguistic
divides. For instance, cartel members' geographic dispersion (Zimmerman and Connor 2005)
and cultural cohesion (van Driel 2000; Levenstein and Suslow 2004, 2006a; Zimmerman and
Connor 2005) may aect cartel stability.7 I attempt to rule out these channels through which
linguistic dierences may be correlated with cartel duration.
The analysis is subject an important limitation, and the results may best be interpreted with
caution. Cartel duration does not fully capture many important aspects of cartel success, such
as excess cartel prots or overcharges (Levenstein and Suslow 2006a). But arguably neither
marginal costs nor would-be competitive prices are directly observable (Martins et al. 1996).
The approach adopted here may have advantages to the extent that duration is more directly
and cleanly observed (at least in the EC data) and can be more reliably mapped to cartel
success (Seventeen and Suslow 2006a, p. 50).
The results may have important policy implications. The debate over the exchange of
information between competitors is one of the most controversial in recent years (Capobianco
2004; Levenstein and Suslow 2006b; OECD 2010). Although competition laws in general do not
treat information exchange as illegal per se (OECD 2010) and provide no clear guidelines on
when antitrust authoerities should enforce law rules against such practices,8 the data analyzed
here indicate that exchange of individual price and sales data with following up inter-rm
transfers greatly prolongs the duration of illegal cartels. A tough line on such information
exchange seems appropriate.9
Although the discussion to follow focuses primarily on cartel oenses, it demonstrates an
empirical approach to the study of criminal organizations that might be of broader interest. The
incentives that govern cartel behavior are similar to those that govern large-scale, international
conspiracies such as narcotics violations, arms and human tracking and terrorism (Spagnolo
2000, 2004). In each, the lack of enforceable contracts may create free riding, hold-up, and moral
hazard problems, and conspirators may develop monitoring and communication mechanisms to
7For instance, van Driel (2000) explores the eects of group development in creating a shared culture among
rm managers that in turn facilitates collusion. He provides evidence from four European transportation
industries that cultural coherence stabilizes a cartel.
8An exception is Article 9 of the Mexican Competition Act. The Act explicitly prohibits the \exchange of
information" with the object or eect of xing, increasing or manipulating prices.
9Vives (2007) makes a similar statement that the exchange of individual price and quantity data is likely to
facilitate collusion and that prohibition aginast such information exchange is desirable, although the impact of
such collusive practices on cartel stability is not analyzed formally as in the present paper.
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stabilize cooperation. In principle, therefore, the theoretical literature on private monitoring
and communication (i.e., Harrington and Skrzypacz 2011) and the empirical results presented
here may extend to other forms of organized crime.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I provide an overview of the literature on the
organizational determinants of cartel duration. In Section 3, I describe my data. In Section
4, I present hazard model estimates of the correlation between the LSP and cartel duration.
Section 5 presents my main results. Section 6 investigates the robustness of the results. Section
7 concludes.
2. Existing Literature
I am not aware of others who have pointed out the link between linguistic dierences and cartel
organization, though scholars such as Levenstein and Suslow (2011) have pointed out that
international cartels face unique challenges posed by linguistic dierences, among other factors,
and that \these factors make international collusion especially dicult to maintain" (p. 457).
Nevertheless, Levenstein and Suslow did not establish a link between linguistic dierences,
cartel organization and cartel duration.
Empirically, my work is related to a number of other attempts to uncover the link between
cartel organization and cartel duration, as well to Taylor (2007), who investigates the relation-
ship between cartel organization and cartel success| dened as deviations from competitive
outputs. Levenstein and Suslow (2006a) have already provided a detailed review of most of the
empirical studies, so I do not attempt to be comprehensive, and instead summarize the main
ndings of the more relevant and recent studies.
Based on a time-series of mercury cartel activities (1928-1972), MacKie-Mason and Pindyck
(1987) argue that organizational issues are not important in determining cartel success. On the
opposite side are Zimmerman and Connor (2005) who demonstrate the importance of cartel
organization for the duration of international cartels and conclude that further research into
this aspect of cartel success remains \a crucial area of consideration in future analysis" (p. 23).
Zimmerman and Connor's view is conrmed by Suslow's (2005) ndings that the existence of
self-imposed penalties has a signicant positive relationship with duration and that the more
complex a cartel's organization structure, the longer the cartel endures.
Levenstein and Suslow (2006a) highlight the importance of cartel organization, such as
trade association involvement or use of joint sales agencies, noting that \although it has not
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been formally tested, our hypothesis is that the more elaborate these [information] sharing
and monitoring mechanisms ... the more stable the cartel" (p. 71). Following Levenstein
and Suslow (2006a), a renewed emphasis has been placed on the importance of a cartel's
internal underpinnings. Particularly, the authors themselves went on to explore their own
hypothesis, using 81 modern-day international cartels (see Levenstein and Suslow 2011). They
made a strong case for the relevance of agreed-upon within-cartel transfers scheme and other
organizational features (e.g., symmetric punishment) on cartel duration. On the opposite side is
work by De (2010) who similarly used the EC data but did not nd evidence that within-cartel
transfers aected duration (p. 60).
Taylor (2007) studies cartel success, (inversely) dened as \the growth rate of monthly
[cartelized] industry output minus the growth rate of ... [an] index of business activity" (p. 608),
and conrms most of Suslow (2005)'s ndings on the role of organizational factors. Specially,
he nds that agreements with explicit monitoring, quotas, and restrictions on new production
capacity were more successful at reducing output under the National Industrial Recovery Act
of 1933. He also nds that more complex agreements were more successful.
Some of these authors (Suslow 2005; Levenstein and Suslow 2006a, 2011; Taylor 2007)
acknowledge the potential endogeneity problem in estimating the relationship between cartel
success and cartels' organization.10 However, none of the authors have attempted to formally
address the problem, which is the focus of my paper. The existing analyses may also be prone
to omitted variable bias: cartels that exchange private information and conduct transfers may
dier from cartels without such collusive practices along many market dimension, some of which
are hard to measure, and thus it becomes dicult to pinpoint the true underlying determinants
of cartel duration.
My paper is complementary to this growing and lively literature that takes cartels' orga-
nizational features as exogenous (or predetermined) and studies their eects on cartel success:
Understanding the endogeneity of cartel organizational features (such as the LSP) may help
resolve the empirical disputes in this literature that puts the features on the right-hand side of
various regressions. Additionally, my paper attemps to correct for one of the potential omitted
variabel biases, in particular that in estimating the eect of the LSP.
10Levenstein and Suslow (2006a), for instance, note that \[cartel] organization is ... not an exogenous vari-
able". See Levenstein and Suslow (2006a), p. 74.
PRELIMINARY VERSION. DO NOT CIRCULATE OR CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION. 8
3. Data
I use data from the complete set of EC cartel decisions between December 17, 1980 to April 13,
2011. The EC data include 143 cartels decided by the EC, the Court of First Instance (CFI)
and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). A rich variety of case-specic information is recorded
in the data, including the start and end dates of a cartel, the aected product and geographic
markets, and the nationalities of the rms.11 These are the key variables of interest in this
paper. My analysis restricts to 135 cartels for which information on cartels' organizational
features (such as the LSP) is available. I refer to the 135 cartels as my full cartel sample.
Data limitation and remedy. The EC data suers from a lack of reliable information on
producer concentration. The variable has been shown to be an important determinant of cartel
stability (Selten 1973) and could be correlated with a cartel's decision to monitor cheating.
Omission of this variable could well bias some of the estimated eects of leniency and those
of other predictors in my empirical analysis. In some cases, the EC reports market shares
of cartel participants near the end of an infringement. However, using the information (e.g.,
De 2010) may give rise to endogeneity problems: Existing market shares may be results of
cartel activities in deterring entries (Harrington 1989; Seventeen and Suslow 2011). Therefore,
market concentration may increase as collusion advances; Alternatively, the market shares of a
cartel may decrease over its lifetime if collusive prots attract more (non-conspiring) entrants
into the market in question than would be in a more competitive environment (Sutton 1991,
1998; Symeonidis 2002; and Levenstein and Suslow 2010). To remedy at least in part the
potential model misspecication bias, I include, as do Levenstein and Suslow (2011), the total
number of participating cartelists as a crude measure of producer concentration. Although old
participants may exit and new rms may join force in mid of an infringement, the total number
of participated rms is invariant to the duration of the infringement.
Cartel duration. The main variables and model parameters are dened in Table 1, and
the corresponding descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 2. Column 1 of Table 2 gives
descriptive statistics for the full cartel sample. The remaining columns give descriptive statistics
11Unless otherwise specied, all euro values throughout the paper are adjusted to 2010 e using standard
measure of general price trends published by the OECD on the Producer Price Indices for prices, labor costs
and interest rates of domestic manufacturing.
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Table 1. Terms and Definitions of Main Variables
Denition
Cartel An agreement or a series of agreements between competing rms or associations
of rms that constitutes a single infringement, according to the EC, of Art. 101
(formerly Art. 81 and Art. 85) of the EC treaty.
Start date Start date of the rst agreement between any two participants of a cartel.
End date The ending date of the last agreement(s) between any two (or more) cartel par-
ticipants that is reported in the EC's last published decision on the cartel. For
cartels that continued at least until the date of the EC's last published decision
(hereafter \decision date") and whose ending dates are (therefore) unpublished,
it is set as the decision date.a
A. Cartel Durability Measures
DURATION The number of months between a cartel's start and end dates that is proven by
documented evidence.
DURATION-2 The greater of [1] the number of months elapsed between a cartel's start and end
dates that is suspected by the EC but without documented evidence; and [2]
DURATION.
B. Linguistic Dierences Measure
LANG Number of dierent national languages of the cartel members.
C. Cartel Organizational Features
LYSINE 1 if cartel monitors the agreement(s) by having rms report sales, price, market
share or customers and conditions within-cartel transfers (money or inter-rm
sales) on those reports; 0 otherwise.
MARKET-ALLOC 1 if members of a cartel agreed to allocate specic customers or types of customers,
products, or territories among themselves; 0 otherwise.
TRADE-ASSO 1 if a trade association is actively involved in facilitating collusion; 0 otherwise.
MARKET-LDR 1 if one or more members took the role of a price or market leader; 0 otherwise.
RETALIATION 1 if retaliatory action was taken following cheating; 0 otherwise.
D. Antitrust Policies
LENIENCY 0 if a cartel ends before July 18, 1996; 1 if it ends after July 18, 1996, but before
February 19, 2002; 2 if it ends after February 19, 2002.
FINES The total corporate cartel nes per infringement issued by the EC during the
previous scal year.
E. Market Structure
FIRMS The total number of competitors in a cartel.
INDUSTRY TYPE Categorical variable indicating the type of industry where a cartel operates. The
industry types are wholesale and retail trade; food, feed and tobacco; chemicals;
transport; primary material; machinery, equipment and metal products; and
other products and services.
(continued overleaf )
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Table 1. (Continued)
Denition
MARKET SCOPE Categorical variable indicating the scope of the geographic market. The scopes
are national, multinational (but less then EU-wide), EEA-wide or EU-wide, and
worldwide.
F. Macroeconomic Fluctuations
 GDP Annual growth rate of the real domestic product of the relevant geographic mar-
ket. If the relevant geographic market consisted of multiple economic areas in
multiple countries, it is the weighted average of the growth rates. The weight
applied is the annual national GDP.
PEAK-TROUGH 1 if a cartel ended during a peak-to-trough period of a business circle; 0 otherwise.
If the relevant geographic market consisted of multiple economic areas in multiple
countries, it is the weighted average of the indicators. The weight applied is the
annual national GDP.
INTEREST Annual average short-term interest rates, 3-month maturity. If the relevant geo-
graphic market consisted of multiple economic areas in multiple countries, it is
the weighted average of the short-term rates. The weight applied is the annual
national GDP.
POS-SHOCK Positive deviation of real annual GDP from trend line (using the Hodrick-Prescott
lter). If the relevant geographic market consisted of multiple economic areas
in multiple countries, it is the weighted average of the deviations. The weight
applied is the annual national GDP.
NEG-SHOCK Negative deviation of real annual GDP from trend line (using the Hodrick-Prescott
lter). If the relevant geographic market consisted of multiple economic areas
in multiple countries, it is the weighted average of the deviations. The weight
applied is the annual national GDP.
a. Only a limited number (15) of sampled cartels continued until the decision date. For such cartels, the EC's last
published decision routinely orders the rms to refrain from the alleged agreement within a limited time scope.
for groups of cartels at dierent quartiles of the number of languages of a cartel. This is useful
because the number of language is my instrument for the LSP.
Besides reporting proven start dates of agreements, the EC sometimes reports suspected
start dates without support of documented evidence. Unless stated otherwise, throughout the
paper I refer, as do Levenstein and Suslow (2011), to the start date of an agreement as its
proven start date. Moreover, rms may participate in and leave a cartel at dierent dates;
collusive agreements sometimes start in one region then spread over many regions (Levenstein
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A. Cartel Duration, Organizational Features, Antitrust Policies, Market Concentration and Macroeconomic Fluctuations
By quartile of LANG
full cartel sample (1) (2) (3) (4)
Cartel Durability Measures
DURATION 96.57 (89:25) 96 129 58 73
DURATION-2 105.36 (99:21) 110 136 58 77
Levenstein and Suslow (2011) 97.2 (69:6)
Suslow (2005) 99.6 (74:4)
Cartel Organizational Features
LYSINE (1=yes) 0.41 (0:49) 0.47 0.41 0.30 0.36
MARKET-ALLOC (1=yes) 0.72 (0:45) 0.76 0.68 0.5 0.76
RETALIATION (1=yes) 0.30 (0:46) 0.25 0.22 0.6 0.39
TRADE-ASSO (1=yes) 0.53 (0:50) 0.55 0.49 0.6 0.52
MARKET-LDR (1=yes) 0.46 (0:50) 0.51 0.38 0.3 0.52
Antitrust Policies
LENIENCY 0.74 (0:80) 0.78 0.78 0.3 0.76
FINES (e mln.) 453 (804) 418 528 308 473
Market Structure and Macroeconomic Fluctuations
FIRMS 450 (4; 201) 903 223 14 82
INTEREST (%) 6.06 (3:56) 5.42 6.58 9.47 5.49
PEAK-TROUGH (1=yes) 0.54 (0:47) 0.53 0.54 0.40 0.60
GDP (%) 2.39 (1:57) 2.35 2.52 2.19 2.36
POS-SHOCK (e bln.) 25,336 (64; 840) 18,956 28,886 6,064 37,829
NEG-SHOCK (e bln.) 30,988 (56; 871) 39,317 26,477 19,052 25,781
Observations 135 55 37 10 33
Source.{ Author's calculations based on 135 cartel decisions by the European Commission and judgments of the Court of First
Instance and the European Court of Justice for the period December 1980 to April 2011.
Note.{ Standard deviations are in parenthesis. Quartiles of LANG are: (1) one langauge; (2) two languages; (3) three languages;
(4) four or more dierent languages.
and Suslow 2011). I refer, as do the EC, the CFI and Levenstein and Suslow (2011), to
DURATION as the number of months elapsed from the proven start date of the rst agreement
to the end date of the last agreement between any two participants of a cartel.12 In robustness
checks, I obtain similar results using suspected durations.
12In various judgments, the Court of First Instance made it clear that it was not necessary, particularly in
the case of a complex infringement of considerable duration, for the EC to characterize it as exclusively an
agreement or concerted practice, or to split it up into separate infringements. See, e.g., OJ [1999] L 76/1, [1999]
4 CMLR 1316, on appeal Cases T-202/98 etc Tate & Lyle v Commission (judgment pending), para 70. See also
9 OJ [1994] L 243/1, [1994] 5 CMLR 547, para 128 and OJ [1999] L 24/1, [1999] 5 CMLR 402, paras 131-132,
on appeal Cases T-9/99 etc HFB Holding v Commission (judgment pending).
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Panel B. Industry Type and Market Scope
By quartile of LANG
full cartel sample (1) (2) (3) (4)
INDUSTRY TYPE
Wholesale & retail trade 5 (3.7%) 1 1 1 2
Food, feed & tobacco 10 (7.4%) 2 2 1 5
Primary material 19 (14.1%) 4 8 6 1
Chemicals 41 (30.4%) 16 13 0 12
Mach., equip. & metal products 24 (17.8%) 13 5 1 5
Transport 15 (11.1%) 11 2 1 1
Other products & services 21 (15.6%) 8 6 0 7
MARKET SCOPE
National 36 (26.7%) 11 9 5 11
Multinational 17 (12.6 %) 8 5 2 2
EEA-wide or EU-wide 59 (43.7 %) 26 18 3 12
Worldwide 23 (17%) 10 5 0 8
Observations 135 55 37 10 33
Source.{ Author's calculations based on 135 cartel decisions by the European Commission and judgments of the Court of First
Instance and the European Court of Justice for the period December 1980 to April 2011.
Note.{ The panel reports the number of observations in each industry and market scope category, respectively. Percentages are
in parenthesis. Quartiles of LANG are: (1) one langauge; (2) two dierent languages; (3) three dierent languages; (4) four or
more dierent languages.
The average DURATION (DURATION-2) of cartels in my sample is approximately 96.6 months
(resp. 105.4 months). This is comparable with the average duration of international cartels
reported by Levenstein and Suslow (2011) (approx. 97.2 months) and that of pre-World War II
European cartels (approx. 99.6 months) reported by Suslow (2005). There are large dierences
in duration across the sampled cartels in terms of both proven and suspected duration, and the
standard deviation of DURATION and DURATION-2 are 89.3 and 99.2 months, respectively.
Cartel Organizational Features. I use a variety of variables to capture the dierences in
cartels' organization. My main variable, LYSINE, indicates whether a cartel uses the lysine strat-
egy prole. It equals one if cartel members exchanged information on sales, prices, customers
or market shares for monitoring purposes and conditioned monetary transfers or inter-rms
sales on the information.
Various other cartel organizational features are considered| including market allocation
scheme, involvement of a trade association, market leader arrangement and retaliation. They
control for factors that are correlated with both the LSP and cartel duration that are not
captured by the other variables. Levenstein and Suslow (2011), for example, show that market
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allocation may reduce the likelihood that a cartel is detected and at the same time reduces the
need to create monitoring mechanisms.13 Admittedly, some of these features are also potentially
endogenous variables. For instance, cartels that have to punish their members may suer from
fundamental disagreements over how to set prices or divide markets (Levenstein and Suslow
2011, p. 485) and be otherwise unsustainable without retaliatory measures. However, like
previous contributors to this literature, I am severely hampered by the absence of reliable
instruments for these potential endogenous variables. Investigating and controlling for the
potential endogeneity of these organizational features are beyond the scope the present study.
Antitrust policies. A second set of variables captures aspects of the institutional environ-
ment where cartels form and dissolve. LENIENCY equals zero if a cartel dissolved before July
18, 1996, i.e., before a leniency regime was introduced in the EU; it equals one if the cartel
failed after July 18, 1996 but before February 19, 2002, i.e., the period during which the 1996
Leniency Notice was in eect; it equals two if the cartel broke up after February 19, 2002,
i.e., after the existing leniency regime replaced the 1996 regime. A second institution variable,
FINES, controls for the severity of punishment. Similar to that in Miller (2009), the penalty
variable is dened as the total corporate nes issued by the EC during the previous scal year.14
Market Structure and Macroeconomic Fluctuations. The next two sets of variables
reect the possible variations in the market and macroeconomic environments where cartels
operate. Some of these variables control for, at least in part, the potential heterogeneity in
dissolution probabilities across cartels. These variables have been used in previous analysis of
cartel duration (Zimmerman and Connor 2005; Suslow 2005; Levenstein and Suslow 2011). I
do not describe these well-known variables in detail here, and instead refer the reader to the
excellent variable description in Levenstien and Suslow's and Zimmerman and Connor's articles.
Summary statistics of these variables are reported in the nal rows of Panel A of Table 2 and
Panel B of the table.
4. The LSP and Cartel Duration: Simple Hazard Model Estimates
The regression analysis begins with a \nave" hazard model where I specify dissolution hazard|
the probability of cartel dissolution conditional on cartel not having already collapsed| as a
13Levenstein and Suslow (2011), p. 475 and p.479.
14Using the average corporate nes per cartel during the previous year does not alter the results signicantly.
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function of LYSINE and the other explanatory variables. In this way, the model ignores the
potential endogeneity of the LSP. In what follows, I discuss two alternative empirical specica-
tions. The second specication is a generalization of the rst.
 Cox's (1972) semiparametric proportional hazard model is the most popular ap-
proach towards characterizing the hazard function h(t; ). The model has been used in previous
analysis of cartel durations (e.g., Suslow 2005; Zimmerman and Connor 2005; Levenstein and
Suslow 2011; Zhou 2011) and is exible enough to account for potential inappropriate distri-
bution assumptions that may be involved in parametric methods.15 The hazard function for
cartel i is
hi(t; LYSINEi;xi) = h0(t) exp(LYSINEiLYSINE+ x0ix) (1)
where t is the elapsed time since the start date of a cartel, LYSINEi is the dummy variable
indicating whether cartel i uses the LSP and xi is a vector of other explanatory variables listed
in Table 1. LYSINE (resp. x) is the coecient (resp. vector of coecients) associated with
the use of the LSP (resp. the other explanatory variables), measuring the correlation between
the strategy (resp. the other explanatory variables) with the dissolution hazard. The term
\LYSINEiLYSINE + x
0
ix" shifts the baseline hazard function h0(t), and a positive coecient
indicates that the observed characteristics are positively correlated with the dissolution hazard
and negatively correlated with the cartel duration. The model is semiparametric in that the
baseline hazard h0(t) is a nonparametric function of time, without the inuence of the observable
characteristics specied assuming a particular functional form. I refer to the model as my basic
regression model.
Suppose that there are n observations and k distinct cartel dissolution times. Further
suppose that I can rank the dissolution times such that t1 < t2 < ::: < tk where tj denotes the
dissolution time for the jth cartel. Furthermore, let Rj denote the set of cartels that have not
dissolved until time tj. Then the probability that the m-th cartel will dissolve at time tj given
that some cartel in set Rj will collapse at time tj is
hm(tj; LYSINEm;xm)P
2Rj h (tj; LYSINE ;x )
=
exp(LYSINEmLYSINE+ x
0
mx)P
2Rj exp(LYSINELYSINE+ x
0
x)
: (2)
15The advantages of using Cox (1972) model to analyze time to event data have been widely recognized. See,
e.g., Kalbeisch and Prentice (1980), Meyer (1990), and Perperoglou (2005).
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Taking the product of the conditional probabilities in (2) yields the partial likelihood function
L =
Y
j
"
exp(LYSINEjLYSINE+ x
0
jx)P
2Rj exp(LYSINELYSINE+ x
0
x)
#
;
with corresponding log-likelihood function
lnL =
X
j
24LYSINEjLYSINE+ x0jx   lnX
2Rj
exp(LYSINELYSINE+ x
0
x)
35 : (3)
 Competing risks. A cartel can end for dierent causes: Besides \natural death" such
as defection, independent discoveries by an antitrust prosecutor can also terminate a cartel.
Therefore, estimation of the cartel dissolution hazard function from observed cartel durations
must also consider the censoring of duration for cartels ending due to antitrust interventions
(Levenstein and Suslow 2011). For such cartels, we can only infer that collusion would have
exceeded the observed cartel duration at the time of the cartel's dissolution.
A popular choice towards the analysis of competition risks is using a stratied Cox model
from augmented data (Lunn and McNeil 1995). Let  denote a cartel's failure type where
 = 0 indicates those cartels collapsed in a natural death;  = 1 indicates those cartels that
ended in an antitrust intervention. The joint distribution of failure times and cause of failure
is considered and the hazard function of a particular cause in the presence of all other causes is
estimated. In the absence of ties (i.e., multiple cartel groups fail at the same tj) the full partial
log-likelihood is given by
lnL =
X
j; j=0
 
LYSINEjLYSINE+ x
0
jx

+
X
j; j=1
 
0 + LYSINEjLYSINE+ x
0
jx

 
X
j
ln
24X
2Rj
(exp (LYSINELYSINE+ x
0
x) + exp (0 + LYSINELYSINE+ x
0
x))
35 (4)
where 0 is a constant so that the baseline hazard functions for dierent types of cartel disso-
lution dier by a constant ratio.
Running standard Cox regression on the augmented data set gives the appropriate estimates
of the regression coecients, provided the model t it good. The partial likelihood which results
from the method is precisely the partial likelihood suggested by Kalbeisch and Prentice (1980)
for competing risks.
Table 3 reports the Cox regression estimates of the coecients. Unless otherwise stated, the
coecient of interest throughout the paper is that of the LSP, the eect of the lysine strategy
prole on cartel duration.
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Figure 1. Cartel Dissolution Hazard by Governance and Compensation System
Notes: The sample consists 135 cartels decided by the EC, the CFI and the ECJ between December 17, 1980 to April 13, 2011. The
circled line corresponds to cartels that use the lysine strategy prole with the dashed line indicating the 95% condence interval.
The solid line corresponds to cartels without the lysine strategy prole with the shaded area indicating the 95% condence interval.
Column (1) shows that in the full cartel sample there is a negative but statistically in-
signicant correlation between the LSP and cartel duration. Figure 1 shows this relationship
diagrammatically. In Column (2), I add market conditions as regressors (I follow the literature
to use the number of colluding rms, the industrial sectors and the geographic market scope).
This changes the coecient of the LSP little. Columns (3)-(4) show that the correlation be-
tween the LSP and cartel duration is quite similar to that in (1) and (2) with controls for
changes in macroeconomic conditions (column (3)) and the eects of antitrust policies (column
(4)).
In column (5), I add dummies for other cartel organizational features. As discussed in
the previous section, including these features may give rise to endogeneity concerns. The
main point here is that the weak and statistically insignicant correlation between the LSP
and cartel duration is unaected by the inclusion of these variables as additional controls in
the specication. Finally, column (6) includes all the exogenous covariates and LYSINE, but
excludes the other cartel organizational features; column (7) adds all the variables in this table
simultaneously. Again, these controls have very little eect on my main estimate.
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Table 3. The Lysine Strategy Profile and Cartel Duration (Cox Hazard Model Estimates)
Dependent Variable Is Log(DURATION+1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LYSINE 0:16 0:03 0:11 0:05  0:18 0:06  0:14
(0:24) (0:27) (0:29) (0:28) (0:30) (0:31) (0:37)
Log(FIRMS)  0:31  0:38  0:34  0:39  0:39  0:44
(0:12) (0:11) (0:13) (0:15) (0:12) (0:16)
Food, feed & tobacco  1:02  1:53  1:15  1:27  1:76  2:29
(0:75) (0:81) (0:81) (0:79) (0:85) (0:95)
Primary material  0:82  1:13  0:93  1:28  0:85  1:84
(0:77) (0:70) (0:81) (0:84) (0:66) (0:87)
Chemicals  0:89  1:22  0:98  1:23  1:23  2:03
(0:68) (0:69) (0:73) (0:74) (0:62) (0:80)
Machinery, equipment &  1:08  1:45  1:21  1:40  1:53  2:28
metal products (0:69) (0:71) (0:75) (0:78) (0:68) (0:84)
Transport  1:43  1:76  1:64  1:88  1:87  2:61
(0:91) (0:90) (0:98) (1:08) (0:95) (1:15)
Other products & services  0:76  1:07  0:82  0:91  1:20  1:71
(0:73) (0:75) (0:76) (0:81) (0:74) (0:86)
Multinational 0:15 0:05 0:24 0:02 0:02 0:06
(0:70) (0:67) (0:70) (0:71) (0:71) (0:78)
EEA-wide or EU-wide 0:16 0:13 0:23 0:13  0:22  0:02
(0:48) (0:49) (0:48) (0:46) (0:56) (0:61)
Worldwide 0:56 0:55 0:62 0:62  0:07 0:23
(0:48) (0:62) (0:49) (0:48) (0:76) (0:88)
Log(INTEREST) 0.29  0:12 0:09
(0:29) (0:83) (0:87)
Log(PEAK-TROUGH+1) 0.31 0:41 0:02
(0:36) (0:37) (0:41)
Log( GDP+2)  0:44  0:57  0:60
(0:19) (0:19) (0:20)
Log(POS-SHOCK)  0:05 0:06 0:02
(0:11) (0:13) (0:15)
Log(NEG-SHOCK) 0:02 0:14 0:11
(0:11) (0:14) (0:15)
EC's 1996 Leniency  0:31  0:20  0:04
(0:28) (0:60) (0:66)
EC's 2002 Leniency  0:34  1:27  1:11
(0:46) (0:91) (0:99)
Log(FINES) 0:01 0:10 0:09
(0:05) (0:07) (0:07)
MARKET-ALLOC  0:72  0:71
(0:37) (0:42)
RETALIATION 0:37 0:54
(0:30) (0:34)
TRADE-ASSO  0:20  0:38
(0:27) (0:33)
(continued overleaf )
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Table 3. (Continued)
Dependent Variable Is Log(DURATION+1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
MARKET-LDR 0:83 0:79
(0:32) (0:36)
Observations 135 135 135 135 135 135 135
Number of failures 72 72 72 72 72 72 72
Time at risk 571.003 571.003 571.003 571.003 571.003 571.003 571.003
Log-pseudo likelihood -292.32 -284.82 -278.81 -284.23 -278.83 -276.76 -271.02
Note.{ All regressions are Cox proportional hazard models with competing risks. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
All euro values are in 2010 e . Omitted industry category is \wholesale and retail trade". Omitted market scope category is
\national market". Omitted LENIENCY category is \no leniency". The source for these values is author's calculations based
on 135 cartel decisions by the EC between 1980 and April 2011. *** signicant at 1 percent level. ** signicant at 5 percent
level. * signicant at 10 percent level.
Overall, the results in Table 3 show a weak correlation between the lysine strategy prole and
cartel duration. These results largely resemble those of a previous stduy (De 2010) that is based
on a time series of cartel discoveries by the EC for the years 1990-2008.16 However, there are two
important reasons for not interpreting this weak relationship as a lack of strong causal eect.
First, weak cartels| cartels that would otherwise be unsustainable or short-lived| may need
and choose the LSP. Arguably, more important than this reverse causality problem, there are
many omitted determinants of cartel duration dierences that will naturally be correlated with
a cartel's choice regarding its organizational mechanisms, such as the LSP. These problems
introduce negative bias in the estimates of the eect of the LSP on cartel duration. Both
problems could be solved if we had an instrument for the LSP. Such an instrument must be
an important factor in accounting for the variation in the choices regarding the LSP, but have
no direct eect on cartel duration. The discussion to follow proposes an identication strategy
that uses cartel members' linguistic dierences as an instrument.
5. The LSP and Cartel Duration:
Two Stage Residual Inclusion Instrumental Variable Results
5.1. Estimation Framework
Owning to the inherent nonlinearity of the hazard models, attempting to correct for endo-
geneity bias via application of the conventional two-stage least squares (2SLS) methods will be
16See the online appendix for an analysis using the 1990-2008 data of EC cartel discoveries. Unfortunately,
I do not have access to the data used by the other authors to test for the existence of endogeneity in these
datasets.
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susceptible to bias (Terza, Bradford and Dismuke 2008). To address the problem, I implement
the two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) estimator as suggested by Terza, Basu and Rathouz
(2008). The 2SRI approach is a nonlinear extension of the conventional 2SLS method. The
approach can provide unbiased and consistent estimates when analyzing hazard models in the
event of endogenous explanatory variables (Terza, Basu and Rathouz 2008).
I consider the number of dierent national languages of cartel members to be a good candi-
date instrument based on the fact that monitoring contacts are usually undertaken by low-level
managers who may not be multilingual in general. Linguistic dierence therefore poses a some-
times insurmountable barrier to monitoring|the key component of the LSP. Moreover, there
is no theoretic reason to believe that the number of languages should aect cartel durability
except through the intermediation of the choice for the LSP.
My 2SRI model has two stages. In the rst-stage, I regress the potentially endogenous
choice of the LSP| LYSINE| on the vector exogenous variables (xLYSINE) and the instrumental
variable (LANG):
LYSINEi = x
LYSINE
i x + LANGiLANG + !i (5)
where xLYSINE is a subset of x, the \'s" are the coecient parameters to be estimated and !i
denotes the random regression error term. The parameters of equation (5) are estimated using
a probit model and the residuals (!^i's) are saved.
A second-stage regression is then estimated for the cartel dissolution hazard that includes
the rst-stage residuals as an additional explanatory variable in the regression equation together
with the other explanatory variables used in equation (1):
hi(t; LYSINEi;xi; !^i) = h0(t) exp(LYSINEi LYSINE+ x0ix + !^i!) (6)
where the \'s" are the coecient parameters to be estimated. The residuals serve two roles
in equation (6). First, they control for potential endogeneity of the LSP. Second, their in-
clusion provides a simple diagnostic tool to statistically test for endogeneity of LYSINE: If !
is statistically signicant in equation (6), then LYSINE is endogenous; If, on the other hand,
! is insignicant, then LYSINE is considered exogenous and, consequently, the \nave" model
dened in equation (1) is preferred on eciency grounds.
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The full partial log-likelihood function for the two-stage residual inclusion instrumental
variable model is given by
lnL =
X
j; j=0
 
LYSINEjLYSINE+ !^j! + x
0
jx

+
X
j; j=1
 
0 + LYSINEjLYSINE+ x
0
jx

 
X
j
ln
24X
2Rj
(exp (LYSINELYSINE+ x
0
x) + exp (0 + LYSINELYSINE+ x
0
x))
35
where 0 is a constant so that the baseline hazard functions for dierent types of cartel disso-
lution dier by a constant ratio.
I favor this nonlinear 2SRI approach for two reasons: First, it is appropriate given the data
structure (Terza, Bradford and Dismuke 2008). Second, it yields consistent estimator of the
eect of the LSP. Moreover, Terza (2006) shows that for models like equation (6) in which
observable (i.e., LYSINE, x) and unobservable (i.e., !) regressors are given symmetric treatment
in the specication, alternative estimators like the generalized method of moments are dicult
to implement.
5.2. Determinants of the LSP
Table 4 provides evidence in support of the hypothesis that a cartel's decision to use the LSP
was determined, at least in part, by linguistic dierences. The rst-stage relationship between
linguistic dierences and the LSP is strongly negative: the number of a cartel's languages
is signicantly related to the incidence of the LSP at over 90 percent condence (regression
(1) in Table 4), and this relationship is robust to the inclusion of controls for the eects of
macroeconomic uctuations (regression (2) in Table 4), antitrust policies (regression (3) in
Table 4) and the other cartel organizational features (regression (4) in Table 4). Column (5)
includes all the exogenous covariates, but excludes the other organizational features that are
potentially exogenous. Column (6) relates all the explanatory variables in this table to the
incidence of the LSP and conrms the results in columns (1)-(5). Together, these covariates
explain from 32 to 48 percent of the dierences in cartels' choice regarding the use of the LSP.
I experimented with a variety of other instrumental variables, including a categorical variable
indicting the number of dierent languages spoken by the cartel members (one, two, three, four
and more langauges), a quadratic term for the number of languages, the number of dierent
language families (e.g., Italic, Germanic, Slavic, Baltic, Arabic, east Asian, etc.) of the cartel
members, and the number of countries where the cartel members are located. In the rst two
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cases, the coecient estimates are negative as expected and sometimes marginally statistically
signicant (regressions not shown). However, the rst-stage results in these cases are weaker
than the specications presented in Table 4 (results not shown). In the last two cases, the
coecient estimates are not statistically signicant at conventional levels. Therefore, I opt for
the more parsimonious specication above.
5.3. The LSP and Cartel Duration: Main Empirical Result
Panel A of Table 5 reports 2SRI estimates of the coecients of interest. Panel B gives the
corresponding rst stages, with the other control variables indicated in that column (full results
not reported to save space).17 The residuals !^'s on the use of the LSP derived from equation (5)
are positive and highly signicant across all the specications, which is indicative of endogeneity
bias in the ndings from the simple hazard models shown in Table 3.
An instrumental variable estimate including market structure controls yields point estimates
of -2.88 (robust standard error 1.45) on cartel dissolution hazard, which is signicant at 95
percent condence (column (1) in Table 5). The point estimate indicates that using the LSP
decreases (resp. increases) the dissolution hazard (resp. expected cartel duration) by 16.8 times
(expf2:88g   1  16:8).18 This estimate is larger in absolute value than the corresponding
\nave" Cox hazard model estimate (0.03). This suggests that ignoring the endogeneity of the
LSP produces biased estimate of the its impact on duration.
The 2SRI estimate with additional controls for macroeconomic uctuations is similarly large,
negative, and signicant at -3.69 (robust standard error 1.52 in column (2)). The eect of the
LSP is robust to the inclusion of additional controls for antitrust policies (column (3) in Table
5) although the estimate is only marginally signicant at 90 percent condence.
Column (4) shows that adding the other cartel organizational features does not change the
relationship: the LSP coecient is now -2.41 with robust standard error of 1.16. Since I have
instrumented for the LSP, I make the causal assertion that the duration of cartels that are
discovered by the EC is inuenced by the LSP, whereas a range of other cartel organizational
17See Table 4 for the full results.
18Let fi(t; LYSINEi;xi; !^i) denote the density function of the elapsed time since the start of cartel i. It can be
shown that the expected cartel duration
R
fi(t; LYSINEi;xi; !^i)tdt is given by H0(t)
 1[  ln(1  exp( H0(t)
exp(LYSINEi LYSINE + x
0
ix + !^i!))) exp(LYSINEi LYSINE + x
0
ix + !^i!)] where H0(t) =
R t
0
h0(u)du is the
cumulative baseline hazard function. It follows that
R
fi(t; 1;xi; !^i)tdt = LYSINE
R
fi(t; 0;xi; !^i)tdt.
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Table 4. Determinants of The Use of The Lysine Strategy Profile (First-Stage)
Dependent Variable Is LYSINE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LANG  0:32  0:30  0:33  0:45  0:32  0:45
(0:17) (0:17) (0:17) (0:22) (0:17) (0:21)
Log(FIRMS) 0:17 0:26 0:20 0:22 0:21 0:21
(0:08) (0:10) (0:08) (0:10) (0:10) (0:11)
Food, feed & tobacco  0:22  0:30  0:13  0:46  0:37  0:51
(0:87) (0:90) (0:84) (0:87) (0:87) (1:02)
Primary material 0:78 0:84 0:90 0:29 1:31 0:98
(0:83) (0:89) (0:81) (0:83) (0:98) (1:14)
Chemicals 1:27 1:26 1:36 0:97 1:49 1:40
(0:82) (0:87) (0:80) (0:81) (0:93) (1:05)
Machinery, equipment & 0:50 0:64 0:60 0:27 0:89 0:76
metal products (0:83) (0:87) (0:81) (0:84) (0:92) (1:07)
Transport  1:37  1:50  1:29  1:65  1:57  1:63
(0:89) (0:97) (0:88) (0:94) (0:98) (1:10)
Other products & services  1:24  1:50  1:21  1:48  1:20  1:22
(0:89) (0:89) (0:88) (0:91) (0:91) (1:01)
Multinational 0:23 0:18 0:21  0:34  0:10  0:67
(0:49) (0:52) (0:50) (0:57) (0:58) (0:65)
EEA-wide or EU-wide 0:00 0:27  0:06  0:23 0:12  0:17
(0:36) (0:47) (0:36) (0:41) (0:48) (0:52)
Worldwide 0:94 1:37 0:87 0:61 0:75 0:43
(0:46) (0:73) (0:45) (0:53) (0:81) (0:80)
Log(INTEREST)  0:45  1:72  1:51
(0:26) (0:64) (0:70)
Log(PEAK-TROUGH+1)  0:62  0:52  0:46
(0:47) (0:48) (0:49)
Log( GDP+2)  0:10  0:29  0:46
(0:19) (0:18) (0:20)
Log(POS-SHOCK)  0:18  0:09  0:05
(0:12) (0:12) (0:13)
Log(NEG-SHOCK)  0:21  0:15  0:12
(0:12) (0:12) (0:13)
EC's 1996 Leniency 0:28  0:90  0:76
(0:32) (0:54) (0:54)
EC's 2002 Leniency 0:11  1:32  0:87
(0:45) (0:74) (0:80)
Log(FINES) 0:00  0:07  0:08
(0:06) (0:07) (0:08)
MARKET-ALLOC 1:25 1:35
(0:38) (0:37)
RETALIATION 0:59 0:53
(0:37) (0:34)
TRADE-ASSO  0:04 0:04
(0:33) (0:32)
(continued overleaf )
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Table 4. (Continued)
Dependent Variable Is LYSINE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MARKET-LDR 0:69 0:63
(0:28) (0:31)
Constant  0:93 1:68  1:12  1:97 4:21 2:48
(0:78) (1:46) (0:80) (0:81) (1:69) (1:93)
Observations 135 135 135 135 135 135
Pseudo R2 0.32 -0.36 0.32 0.43 0.39 0.48
Note.{ All regressions are probit. Dependent variable is the incidence of the lysine strategy prole. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses. All euro values are in 2010 e . Omitted LENIENCY category is \no leniency". Omitted industry category
is \wholesale and retail trade". Omitted market scope category is \national market". The source for these values is author's
calculations based on 135 cartel decisions by the EC between 1980 and April 2011. *** signicant at 1 percent level. **
signicant at 5 percent level. * signicant at 10 percent level.
features, such as retaliatory measures and market-leader arrangement, have, at best, a tenuous
impact.
The magnitude of the estimated impact of the LSP on cartel dissolution hazard is large:
when we look at the 2SRI specication with controls for market and macroeconomic conditions
(column (2) in Table 5), for instance, the point estimate indicates that using the LSP decreases
the dissolution hazard by 39 times (expf3:69g   1  39). Thus the LSP leads to a decrease in
dissolution hazard that is greater than a six-percentage-point decline in demand growth does
(3:69=0:56  6:6).
Column (5) includes all the exogenous variables in this table, but excludes organizational
features other than the LSP. The estimated eect of the LSP remains negative, statistically
signicant and large in absolute value. Finally, in column (6), I relate all the explanatory
variables in this table to the dissolution hazard and conrm the results in columns (1)-(5).
The 2SRI coecient is -2.13 instead of -3.34 as in column (5). This shows the exogenous
characteristics do not fully capture all the factors that inuence both a cartel decision to
use the LSP and cartel duration; But whether I use the other organizational features has no
qualitative eect on my main result: The LSP prolongs cartel duration. Overall, the results in
Table 5 show a large eect of the LSP on cartel duration. In the rest of the paper, I investigate
the robustness of these results.
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Table 5. The Lysine Strategy Profile and Cartel Duration (2SRI IV Regressions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Two-Stage Residual Inclusion Instrumental Variable Results
Dependent Variable Is Log(DURATION +1)
LYSINE  2:88  3:69  2:76  2:41  3:34  2:13
(1:45) (1:52) (1:50) (1:16) (1:45) (1:23)
Residuals (!^) from 1st Stagey 2:91 3:83 2:81 2:27 3:41 2:04
(1:44) (1:52) (1:48) (1:11) (1:42) (1:17)
Log(FIRMS)  0:20  0:16  0:21  0:32  0:24  0:37
(0:14) (0:14) (0:15) (0:15) (0:14) (0:16)
Food, feed & tobacco  1:30  1:82  1:37  1:51  1:97  2:33
(0:72) (0:74) (0:77) (0:84) (0:87) (1:02)
Primary material  0:11  0:21  0:17  0:82 0:50  1:07
(0:77) (0:73) (0:82) (0:89) (0:83) (1:06)
Chemicals 0:35 0:38 0:28  0:30 0:53  0:88
(0:84) (0:90) (0:93) (0:86) (0:93) (1:14)
Machinery, equipment &  0:64  0:74  0:71  0:93  0:54  1:53
metal products (0:67) (0:73) (0:74) (0:83) (0:80) (1:02)
Transport  2:15  2:42  2:19  1:86  2:28  2:29
(0:96) (0:90) (0:98) (1:02) (1:00) (1:12)
Other products & services  1:53  2:13  1:50  1:37  1:78  1:89
(0:85) (0:87) (0:85) (0:86) (0:81) (0:89)
Multinational 0:46 0:45 0:55 0:02 0:13  0:03
(0:73) (0:68) (0:73) (0:69) (0:73) (0:78)
EEA-wide or EU-wide 0:21 0:54 0:25  0:05 0:03  0:11
(0:46) (0:51) (0:46) (0:48) (0:55) (0:59)
Worldwide 1:23 1:74 1:19 0:85 0:40 0:41
(0:61) (0:81) (0:60) (0:49) (0:81) (0:88)
Log(INTEREST)  0:12  1:76  0:45
(0:33) (1:19) (1:02)
Log(PEAK-TROUGH+1)  0:20 0:11  0:17
(0:42) (0:39) (0:42)
Log( GDP+2)  0:56  0:79  0:78
(0:21) (0:24) (0:27)
Log(POS-SHOCK)  0:25  0:05  0:02
(0:14) (0:14) (0:15)
Log(NEG-SHOCK)  0:21  0:02 0:04
(0:14) (0:16) (0:16)
EC's 1996 Leniency  0:15  1:16  0:41
(0:30) (0:80) (0:75)
EC's 2002 Leniency  0:35  2:68  1:41
(0:46) (1:14) (1:02)
Log(FINES) 0:02 0:04 0:06
(0:05) (0:08) (0:08)
MARKET-ALLOC  0:05  0:14
(0:53) (0:59)
(continued overleaf )
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Table 5. (Continued)
Dependent Variable Is Log(DURATION +1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RETALIATION 0:57 0:65
(0:32) (0:34)
TRADE-ASSO  0:09  0:18
(0:28) (0:38)
MARKET-LDR 1:22 1:10
(0:39) (0:39)
Number of failures 72 72 72 72 72 72
Time at risk 571.003 571.003 571.003 571.003 571.003 571.003
Log-pseudo likelihood -283.42 -275.91 -282.89 -277.01 -273.92 -269.32
Panel B: First Stage for the Incidence of the LSP
Dependent Variable Is LYSINE
LANG  0:32  0:30  0:33  0:45  0:32  0:45
(0:17) (0:17) (0:17) (0:22) (0:17) (0:21)
Pseudo R2 0.32 -0.36 0.32 0.43 0.39 0.48
Panel C: \Nave" Cox Proportional Hazard Model Results
Dependent Variable Is Log(DURATION +1)
LYSINE 0.03 0.11 0.05 -0.18 0.06 -0.14
(0.27) (0.29) (0.28) (0.30) (0.31) (0.37)
Observations 135 135 135 135 135 135
Note.{ Dependent variable is the Log DURATION + 1. Panel A reports the two-stage residual inclusion estimates, in-
strumented for the incidence of the LSP using Log LANG. The estimates correspond to the rst-stage estimates in Table
4. Panel B reports the corresponding rst stages, with the other control variables indicated in that column (full results not
reported to save space). Panel C reports the Cox proportional hazard model with competing risks regression of the dependent
variable against LYSINE, with the other control variables indicated in that column (full results not reported to save space).
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All euro values are in 2010 e . Omitted LENIENCY category is \no leniency".
Omitted industry category is \wholesale and retail trade". Omitted market scope category is \national market". The source
for these values is author's calculations based on 135 cartel decisions by the EC between 1980 and April 2011. *** signicant
at 1 percent level. ** signicant at 5 percent level. * signicant at 10 percent level. yThe residuals represent the dierence
between cartels' actual use of the LSP and predicted use of the LSP from equation (5).
6. Robustness
6.1. Test for the Direct Eect of Linguistic Dierence on Duration
The validity of my 2SRI results in Table 5 depends on the assumption that cartel members'
linguistic dierences display no direct eect on cartel duration. Although this presumption
appears reasonable (at least to me), here I substantiate it further by directly controlling for
some of the variables that could plausibly be correlated with both linguistic dierences and
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cartel duration, and checking whether the addition of these variables aects my estimates.19
Overall, I nd that my results change remarkable little with the inclusion of these variables.
Firms' geographical dispersion and cultural diversity may also aect cartel duration (Zim-
merman and Connor 2005).20 To control for this, in columns (1) of Table 6, I add the number
of (dierent) nationalities of cartel members. In column (2) of Table 6, I add a dummy for
Asian-European cartel (cartels without an Asian rm colluding with an European rm are the
omitted group) and a dummy for Continental European-Anglo-Saxon cartel (one if a conti-
nental European rm was colluding with a British, Irish, American or Canadian rm; zero
otherwise).21 Both the relationship between linguistic dierences and the incidence of the LSP
and that between the strategy prole and cartel duration are robust to the inclusion of the
geographical dispersion and cultural dierences variables. Finally, column (3) adds all the vari-
ables in columns (1) and (2) simultaneously. Again, these controls have very little eect on my
main estimate.
6.2. Alternative Cartel Duration Measure
An antitrust authority may not want to jeopardize its case by aiming to prove what it thinks
is the correct start date of collusion. Instead, it may aim for an outcome that inicts ade-
quate punishment and results in a conviction.22 Therefore, the authority may not pursue an
aggressive conviction strategy with regards to proving long infringement duration. As a second
robustness check, I test whether my results are robust to alternative measure of cartel duration.
I rerun the specication in column (6) of Table 5 but measure the speed of cartel dissolution
by DURATION-2| the lengths of cartels' lifetime that are suspected by the EC but not
necessarily with supporting document evidence. The coecients in the rst column of Table 6
(specication (4)) show that my results are robust to alternative denition of cartel duration.
19Altonji et al. (2000) propose an econometric methodology to assess the importance of omitted variable
bias. The basic idea is that if the coecient does not change as additional covariates are added in the regression
equation, then the estimate of the coecient of interest is less likely to change if we were able to include some
of the missing omitted variables. My approach here is an informal version of this methodology.
20Zimmerman and Connor provide empirical evidence that increased geographic dispersion and cultural di-
versity among cartel members results in shorter cartel duration.
21All the cartels in the full cartel sample that involved collusion between American and Asian rms also
involved European rms.
22This point is due to the insightful comment of George Deltas.
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Table 6. Robustness Checks for 2SRI IV Regressions of Log DURATION+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Two-Stage Residual Inclusion Instrumental Variable Results
LYSINE  1:86  2:38  2:08  2:43  8:22
(1:12) (1:36) (1:14) (0:95) (1:79)
Residuals (!^) from 1st Stagey 1:77 2:36 2:06 2:39 8:22
(1:09) (1:31) (1:14) (0:92) (1:78)
Log(COUNTRIES)  0:08  0:09
(0:35) (0:35)
ASIAN 0:17 0:12
(0:46) (0:45)
ANGLO-SAXON  0:36  0:32
(0:38) (0:36)
Log(FIRMS)  0:37  0:36  0:36  0:39 0:08
(0:17) (0:16) (0:17) (0:16) (0:30)
Food, feed & tobacco  2:33  2:42  2:40  2:37  2:30
(1:02) (1:12) (1:06) (1:04) (1:67)
Primary material  1:14  1:07  1:12  0:90 2:59
(1:04) (1:16) (1:07) (0:96) (1:87)
Chemicals  1:05  0:64  0:82  0:84 3:60
(1:09) (1:27) (1:15) (0:92) (1:69)
Machinery, equipment &  1:61  1:41  1:51  1:47 2:01
metal products (0:97) (1:10) (1:00) (0:90) (1:83)
Transport  2:26  2:30  2:26  2:67  3:91
(1:03) (1:17) (1:04) (1:14) (1:91)
Other products & services  1:85  1:92  1:87  2:27  2:24
(0:88) (0:96) (0:90) (0:90) (2:04)
Multinational 0:03  0:05 0:01  0:13  2:59
(0:66) (0:81) (0:66) (0:68) (1:03)
EEA-wide or EU-wide  0:04  0:17  0:08  0:13  2:43
(0:62) (0:61) (0:62) (0:59) (0:95)
Worldwide 0:43 0:37 0:38 0:48  1:40
(0:76) (0:84) (0:75) (0:89) (1:04)
Log(INTEREST)  0:38  0:43  0:37  0:75  4:06
(0:76) (1:04) (0:75) (0:89) (1:32)
Log(PEAK-TROUGH+1)  0:17 0:00  0:02  0:18  0:94
(0:48) (0:45) (0:48) (0:44) (0:70)
Log( GDP+2)  0:74  0:80  0:75  0:91  1:87
(0:26) (0:27) (0:26) (0:22) (0:75)
POS-SHOCK  0:01  0:01 0:00  0:01 0:35
(0:14) (0:14) (0:13) (0:16) (0:23)
NEG-SHOCK 0:05 0:05 0:06 0:04 0:33
(0:14) (0:15) (0:14) (0:17) (0:25)
EC's 1996 Leniency  0:35  0:31  0:27  0:53  2:44
(0:61) (0:71) (0:58) (0:72) (1:07)
EC's 2002 Leniency  1:37  1:36  1:32  1:55  4:13
(0:87) (1:04) (0:87) (1:02) (1:32)
(continued overleaf )
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Table 5. (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Two-Stage Residual Inclusion Instrumental Variable Results
Log(FINES) 0:07 0:06 0:07 0:05  0:09
(0:07) (0:08) (0:08) (0:07) (0:10)
MARKET-ALLOCATION  0:18 0:01  0:04  0:09 2:71
(0:53) (0:70) (0:57) (0:44) (1:04)
RETALIATION 0:65 0:78 0:77 0:63 0:82
(0:33) (0:37) (0:36) (0:35) (0:56)
TRADE-ASSOCIATION  0:23  0:16  0:23  0:12 0:89
(0:33) (0:40) (0:34) (0:35) (0:44)
MARKET-LDR 1:08 1:05 1:04 1:11 2:56
(0:39) (0:37) (0:37) (0:36) (0:59)
Number of failures 72 72 72 72 74.56
Time at risk 571.003 571.003 571.003 571.003 497.98
Log-pseudo likelihood -269.67 -269.72 -269.31 -267.70 -321.35
Panel B: First Stage for the Incidence of the LSP
LANG  0:47  0:55  0:60  0:45  0:45
(0:21) (0:32) (0:32) (0:21) (0:21)
Log(COUNTRIES)  0:43  0:47
(0:33) (0:33)
ASIAN 0:96 0:98
(0:55) (0:57)
ANGLO-SAXON  0:14  0:13
(0:43) (0:43)
Pseudo R2 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.48
Panel C: Simple Cox Proportional Hazard with Competing Risks
LYSINE  0:14  0:13  0:13  0:13 0:10
(0:37) (0:38) (0:38) (0:34) (0:45)
Log-pseudo likelihood -271.02 -271.00 -271.00 -270.24 -334.58
Observations 135 135 135 135 135
Note.{ Panel A reports the two-stage residual inclusion estimates with Log DURATION + 1 as dependent variable
for regressions (1), (2), (3) and (5) and Log DURATION-2 + 1 as dependent variable for regression (4). Panel
B reports the corresponding rst stage, with the other control variables indicated in that column (full results not
reported to save space). Panel C reports the estimates from Cox proportional hazard model with competing risks
without instrumenting for the incidence of the LSP, with the other control variables indicated in that column (full
results not reported to save space). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All euro values are in 2010 e . Omitted
LENIENCY category is \no leniency". Omitted industry category is \wholesale and retail trade". Omitted market
scope category is \national market". ASIAN= 1 if one or more Asian rms are colluding with one or more European
rms; 0 otherwise. ANGLO-SAXON= 1 if one or more continental European rms are colluding with one or more
American, British, Irish or Canadian rms; 0 otherwise. The source for these values is author's calculations based
on 135 cartel decisions by the EC between 1980 and April 2011. *** signicant at 1 percent level. ** signicant at 5
percent level. * signicant at 10 percent level. yThe residuals represent the dierence between cartels' actual use of
the LSP and predicted use of the LSP from equation (5).
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6.3. Non-Random Sample Selection
Given that so far I have only examined detected cartels, my analysis may be subject to a
selection-bias problem: As Posner (1970) and several others note (e.g., Taylor 2007; Harrington
and Chang 2009; Miller 2009), one cannot be sure whether these are samples of rms and
industries that were collusion prone or detection prone. This concern is addressed formally
below, using propensity score reweighting techniques (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983).
While one does not observe the criteria that a cartel uses to decide whether to use the LSP,
the reweighting procedure reconstructs this information using observable characteristics. The
procedure has two stages: In the rst stage, I run the same probit model as I did in equation
(5) using LYSINE as the dependent variable. The predicted probability from the probit model
is an estimate of the propensity score; In the next stage, I use the rst stage propensity scores
as weights in a Cox proportional-hazard regression with competing risks using DURATION as
the dependent variable with LYSINE and the other characteristics as covariates. The resulting
weighted Cox proportional-hazard regression gives more weight to cartels without the LSP with
larger estimated probabilities of using the LSP.
Column (5) of Table 6 documents that the propensity score adjustment does not alter
my qualitative conclusions, which hold whether I weight or not. But the size of the LSP's
stabilizing impact becomes unexpectedly large. This suggests the LSP is more eective at
sustaining collusion in the sample of undetected cartels than in the sample of detected ones.
8. Conclusion
This paper addresses a major methodological issue that lies at the core of the cross-industry
empirical literature on cartel durability| the potential endogeneity of the choices of cartels'
organization used as explanatory variables. The causal eect on cartel duration of a particular
and often observed organization|the LSP|is examined. Using a two-stage residual inclusion
method (Terza, Basu and Rathouz 2008), I nd that the LSP has a dramatic causal impact
on cartel duration: cartels that use the strategy prole live longer than cartels without such
a machinery. The impact is statistically signicant, large in magnitude, and robust to various
specication and sample choices, suggesting that the LSP is a powerful instrument for stabilizing
a cartel.
My argument rests on the following premises: Inter-rm communication with the purposes of
monitoring cheating forms the cornerstone of the LSP. Determinants of whether cartel members
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could easily communicate with each other, therefore, have an important eect on the cartel's
ability to use the LSP. A cartel's decision regarding whether to use the LSP was in part
determined by the existence and extent of linguistic barriers between the cartel members. I
exploit these linguistic barriers| measured by the number of dierent national languages of a
cartel| as a source of exogenous variation to estimate the impact of the LSP on cartel duration.
It is useful to point out that my ndings do not imply that a cartel's decision regarding
whether to use the LSP is determined by its members' linguistic divides. I emphasize linguistic
dierences as one of the many factors aecting the decision. Since linguistic barriers faced by
cartels are arguably exogenous, they are useful as an instrument to isolate the eect of cartel
organizational mechanism on cartel durability. In fact, my reading is that it may be possible to
detect and destabilize cartels through focusing investigatory eort in industries in which price
and sales are private information but the rms have little or no linguistic dierences.
There are many questions that my analysis does not address. The LSP is treated largely as
a \black box": The results indicate that preventing a cartel from using the LSP would desta-
bilize the cartel, but do not point out what concrete steps an antitrust authority would take to
distinguish usual, or sometimes welfare enhancing, information ows and inter-rm sales from
the ones that are intended to monitor and penalize deviation. Cartels' organizational features,
such as the LSP, should probably be interpreted as an equilibrium outcome (Harrington and
Skrzypacz 2011), an optimizing behavior of the colluding rms in informational scarce envi-
ronment and under the radar of antitrust detection. A more detailed empirical analysis of the
inner working of the LSP is an important area for future study.
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